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PRIVACY BEFORE TRADE: 
ASSESSING THE WTO-CONSISTENCY OF PRIVACY-BASED CROSS-
BORDER DATA FLOW RESTRICTIONS 
Julian Rotenberg∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The first decades of the 21st century have been characterized by the 
growth of digital trade fueled by new business models based on cross-border 
data flows. With data taking a central role in the digital economy, 
governments and their constituents have become increasingly concerned 
about the commercial handling and commoditization of personal data. 
Consequently, governments have entered the business of regulating cross-
border data flows, especially with the aim of protecting the privacy of their 
citizens. This regulatory trend does not occur in a vacuum: The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) through the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) regulates the types of measures and treatment that governments may 
adopt regarding foreign providers of digital services. Further, several Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) include electronic commerce or digital trade 
chapters establishing obligations regarding cross-border data flows. This 
paper focuses on cross-border data flow restrictions aimed at protecting 
privacy and the assessment of their WTO-consistency. This perspective covers 
a broader range of measures and offers a more comprehensive understanding 
of privacy regulations before trade fora than the existing literature does. In 
particular, this paper draws attention to the assessment of privacy-based 
restrictions under the GATS exceptions and argues that the necessity test and 
chapeau requirements will prove critical in any future adjudication over 
complaints against a country’s policies restricting cross-border data transfers. 
This analysis highlights that the linkage between trade and privacy will 
continue to intensify and that this linkage will be further shaped by countries 





∗ Foreign Associate, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (Washington, DC). Lawyer 
(University of Buenos Aires), LL.M. (Harvard Law School). The article represents 
only the author’s views and not necessarily the views of the firm or any of its clients. 
92 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 28 
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 92 
II. CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS REGULATION ......................................... 94 
III. PRIVACY-BASED DATA RESTRICTIONS ................................................. 97 
A. GEOGRAPHICALLY-BASED OR ADEQUACY 
APPROACH ........................................................................ 97 
B. ORGANIZATIONALLY BASED OR ACCOUNTABILITY 
APPROACH ........................................................................ 99 
C. COMPARATIVE EXAMPLES ............................................. 100 
I. ADEQUACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION .............. 100 
II. OTHER ADEQUACY MODELS ............................ 103 
III. ACCOUNTABILITY: THE APEC CBPR ............. 105 
IV. OTHER ACCOUNTABILITY MODELS ................. 106 
IV. PRIVACY-BASED DATA RESTRICTIONS IN THE WTO 
FRAMEWORK .................................................................................... 107 
A. THE WTO TRADE IN SERVICES FRAMEWORK ............... 107 
B. ASSESSING THE GATS-CONSISTENCY OF DATA 
REGULATIONS ................................................................. 110 
C. GATS GENERAL EXCEPTIONS ....................................... 112 
I. PUBLIC INTERESTS ............................................. 113 
II. NECESSITY ......................................................... 114 
III. CHAPEAU .......................................................... 117 
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 119 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The first decades of the 21st century have been characterized 
by the growth of digital trade fueled by, and in turn contributing to the 
expansion of, new business models based on cross-border data flows. 
With data taking a central role in today’s digital economy, 
governments and their constituents have become increasingly 
concerned about the commercial handling and commoditization of 
personal data. Consequently, governments around the world have 
entered the business of regulating cross-border data flows, especially 
with the aim of protecting the privacy of their citizens. 
This regulatory trend does not occur in a vacuum. Most 
countries in the global economy are members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), which under the General Agreement on Trade in 
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Services (GATS) regulates the types of measures and treatment that 
countries can adopt regarding foreign providers of digital services. 
Further, several countries are parties to Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
that include electronic commerce or digital trade chapters establishing 
obligations regarding cross-border data flows. 
Data flows and data protection are central components of 
economic and trade policy in the digital era. When a country restricts 
cross-border data transfers with the aim of protecting privacy, it might 
incur breaches of legal obligations owed to other countries and firms. 
Considering the relevance of cross-border data flows and the potential 
economic impact of restrictions, countries may soon begin to face 
international litigation against their measures. On an inter-state basis, 
this could occur at the multilateral level before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body. It could also occur at the regional or bilateral level, 
under an FTA replicating the GATS framework or otherwise 
governing data regulations. Although beyond the scope of this paper, 
these measures might also give rise to litigation by foreign firms under 
International Investment Agreements (IIAs) providing for investor-
state arbitration. 
Until recently, scholarly studies of international trade law and 
privacy have remained independent from each other. An emerging 
literature is now beginning to trace the connections between these two 
fields, focusing on the applicability of the GATS framework to privacy 
and cybersecurity laws.1 However, most of these efforts have tended 
to focus on data localization measures, while other types of privacy-
based restrictions have not been sufficiently addressed. 
This paper contributes to bridging this gap by focusing on 
cross-border data flow restrictions aimed at protecting privacy and the 
 
1 See, e.g., Neha Mishra, Privacy, Cybersecurity, and GATS Article XIV: A New 
Frontier for Trade and Internet Regulation?, WORLD TRADE REVIEW 1 (2019); Ines 
Willemyns, The GATS (In)Consistency of Barriers to Digital Services Trade, 207 
LEUVEN CTR. FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE STUDIES WORKING PAPER (2018), 
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/2018/wp207-
willemyns.pdf; Daniel Crosby, Analysis of Data Localization Measures Under WTO 
Services Trade Rules and Commitments, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. & WORLD ECON. F. E15INITIATIVE (2016), http://e15initiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Policy-Brief-Crosby-Final.pdf; Diane A. MacDonald, 
& Christine M. Streatfeild, Personal Data Privacy and the WTO, 36 HOUSTON J. INT’L 
L. 625 (2014). 
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assessment of their WTO-consistency. This perspective covers a 
broader range of measures than data localization requirements and 
offers a more comprehensive understanding of privacy regulations 
before trade fora than the existing literature does. 
The paper draws attention to the need to assess privacy-based 
restrictions under the GATS exceptions. It argues that the necessity test 
and the chapeau requirements will prove critical in any future 
adjudication over complaints against a country’s policies restricting 
cross-border data transfers, emphasizing the need for countries to 
focus on this line of argumentation. This analysis highlights that the 
linkage between trade and privacy will continue to intensify and that 
this linkage will be further shaped by countries being taken to court. 
Part II provides an introduction to cross-border data flows 
regulation and the taxonomies by which to classify them. Part III 
addresses cross-border data flows regulation aimed at protecting 
privacy, analyzing the regulatory approaches of adequacy and 
accountability. Part IV discusses the framing of these measures under 
the WTO services regime, surveying the main applicable provisions of 
the GATS and then focusing on possible claims regarding WTO-
inconsistency, ultimately arguing that the necessity test and the 
chapeau requirements in the GATS exceptions will prove the highest 
hurdle for a respondent country. 
II. CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS REGULATION 
This Part introduces the concept of cross-border data flows 
regulation in the context of international trade. It also reviews some of 
the taxonomies that have been proposed to classify regulatory 
approaches around the globe, setting the scene for the analysis of 
privacy-based restrictions in the next Part. 
Cross-border data flow regulations are employed by 
governments around the world in response to a variety of concerns 
such as cybersecurity, privacy, banking and financial supervision, 
consumer protection, or economic protectionism, to name a few.2 
 
2 See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Data Nationalism, 64(3) EMORY L. J. 677, 
713 (2015). 
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Although privacy-based restrictions on data transfers3 have generally 
been analyzed from the perspective of data protection law, addressing 
them as a subset of cross-border data flow regulations places these 
restrictions within a broader regulatory context and helps assess them 
in the light of the trade regime. 
The OECD defines cross-border data flow regulations as 
“measures that affect the possibility of exchanging and moving data 
across borders.”4 In terms of trade, restrictions on data flows have the 
effect of raising the cost of conducting business across borders by 
obligating companies to store data within a country’s territory or 
imposing requirements for data to be transferred abroad.5 
Several different taxonomies have been proposed to group the 
variety of regulatory approaches to cross-border data transfers 
adopted around the world. Despite differences in criteria, all 
classifications identify the extent of regulatory interference with data 
transfers as the key factor. Regulatory approaches are generally placed 
along a spectrum of increasing regulatory presence, ranging from a 
total absence of regulation, to moderate levels of regulatory incursion, 
and up to highly restrictive regimes. There is not one single taxonomy 
of cross-border data regulations that can be singled out as the most 
precise to the exclusion of all others; they are all useful models to 
analyze differing approaches. Since these taxonomies are drawn from 
real-world cases, they serve as frameworks to better understand how 
the varying degrees of government intervention affect data transfers. 
The taxonomy set forth by the OECD focuses on the degree of 
restrictiveness. It is composed of three main categories: regulations 
allowing for the free flow of data; regulations making data flow 
conditional on safeguards; and regulations making data flow 
 
3 Although there are distinctions between personal data protection and privacy 
protection, for the purposes of this paper the two concepts are employed 
interchangeably. 
4 Francesca Casalini & Javier Lopez Gonzalez, TRADE AND CROSS-BORDER DATA 
FLOWS, OECD TRADE POLICY PAPERS, NO. 220, 11, OECD PUB. (2019), 
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/trade-and-cross-border-data-flows_b2023a47-
en#page11 [hereinafter OECD Report]. 
5 Martina Ferracane, Restrictions on Cross-Border data flows: a taxonomy 2 (ECIPE, 
Working Paper No. 1, 2017), https://ecipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/
Restrictions-on-cross-border-data-flows-a-taxonomy-final1.pdf. 
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conditional on ad-hoc authorization.6 The types of regulations that may 
present trade law challenges will fall under the second and third 
categories, which present tangible government action and imposition 
of restrictions on cross-border transfers. The second category 
comprises approaches that require the fulfilment of certain conditions 
to allow for data transfers; there are different subcategories depending 
on the responsible authority and the method for establishing these 
conditions, and the alternative means available for transfers in the 
absence of such conditions. Generally, these subcategories include 
adequacy or equivalence findings by private entities or government 
agencies, and alternatives like undertakings by data exporters, 
contractual agreements, or data subject consent. The third category 
comprises approaches that limit the alternatives to an adequacy 
finding by a public authority, requiring ad-hoc government approval 
or directly subjecting all transfers to government review. 
Another taxonomy, proposed by Martina Ferracane, focuses 
on the nature of the restrictions to cross-border data flows and 
classifies them into strict and conditional. Strict restrictions are those 
imposing data localization requirements or banning transfers outright, 
while a conditional regime subjects cross-border transfers to certain 
conditions.7 The types of privacy-oriented regulations that are the 
focus of this paper will generally fall under the second group. These 
conditions might be applicable to the country where the data will be 
received, the company carrying out the transfers, or both the recipient 
country and the company. Data flows regimes usually require the 
fulfilment of one specific condition or one among alternative options, 
but in some cases the conditions might be so stringent as to result in 
an outright ban on the transfer. 
Finally, Christopher Kuner distinguishes between two 
opposing “default regulatory positions” in cross-border data flow 
regulations. On one end are frameworks that allow data transfers by 
default and enable regulators to block or limit them, while on the other 
are those that prohibit data flows unless there is a specific legal basis 
for transfer.8 Writing from the standpoint of privacy, Kuner proposes 
 
6 OECD Report, supra note 4, at 16-21. 
7 Ferracane, supra note 5, at 3-4. 
8 CHRISTOPHER KUNER, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND DATA PRIVACY LAW 76 
(2013). 
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a classification of cross-border data flow regulations that aligns neatly 
with Ferracane’s definition of conditional regimes with restrictions 
applicable either to the recipient country or to the entity handling the 
data. This classification will be the basis of the next Part. 
III. PRIVACY-BASED DATA RESTRICTIONS 
This Part deals with cross-border data flow regulations 
particularly addressing privacy. It first introduces the two main 
regulatory approaches to privacy-based restrictions, adequacy and 
accountability, and then surveys comparative examples of each model. 
The most salient model to assess “privacy protection 
frameworks addressing cross-border data transfers”9 has been 
proposed by Kuner, who distinguishes between “geographically-
based” and “organizationally-based” approaches.10 The 
geographically-based or “adequacy” approach focuses on the country 
or location where the data are transferred; it is the one adopted by the 
EU and several other countries. It presents a variety of tests applied to 
the legal regime of the receiving country turning on its adequacy, 
equivalence, or comparability to the home jurisdiction. The 
organizationally-based or “accountability” approach focuses on the 
entities and organization that control the data; it is most prominently 
featured in the APEC Privacy Framework, entrusting data exporting 
companies with guaranteeing a certain level of treatment on the 
personal data that is transferred. Several privacy regimes present an 
overlap or coexistence between both approaches by offering the choice 
between alternative mechanisms for data transfers. The GDPR, for 
instance, adopts an adequacy requirement but also recognizes 
accountability instruments like binding corporate rules and standard 
contractual clauses. 
A. Geographically-Based or Adequacy Approach 
The geographically-based approach regulates data transfers 
based on the level of data protection in place in the receiving or 
 
9 Rolf H. Weber, Regulatory Autonomy and Privacy Standards under the GATS, 7 
ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 25, 31 (2012). 
10 KUNER, supra note 8, at 64-76. 
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importing country. According to this approach, the legal system of the 
receiving or importing country must assure a certain level of 
protection comparable to that of the exporting country for transfers to 
be permitted.11 
This condition is met by establishing the adequacy or 
equivalence between the two legal frameworks. Although generally 
discussed jointly, equivalence entails a level of objective similarity 
between two regulations in terms of tools used and objectives of the 
regulation while adequacy is more flexible as it focuses on a common 
agreed outcome but allows for different tools to achieve it. The most 
famous example of this model is the requirement of an “adequate level 
of protection” established by the EU,12 and hence this approach is 
generally identified as “adequacy.” 
The adequacy of the receiving country’s level of data 
protection is usually determined by a public body such as the data 
protection authority or a higher political authority. Such 
determination can be adopted as a unilateral recognition, with one 
country establishing the adequacy of another and allowing the transfer 
of data to that destination, or a mutual recognition between two or 
more countries enabling free flows of data among them. This mutual 
type of recognition can be implemented through an arrangement 
between data protection agencies or be included in a broader 
agreement such as an FTA. 
In practical terms, the adequacy approach implies that the 
domestic data protection laws of one country or jurisdiction will 
determine the minimum standards that others must meet in order to 
be recipients of data transfers from it. Thus, this approach could be 
used by a government as an incentive for others to enact data 
protection laws with a certain content in order to attract data exports. 
When the sovereign enacting the baseline level of protection has a 
significant trade and political influence, this approach serves as an 
effective way of exporting its regulatory standards. In fact, 
encouraging the adoption of similar regulation by other countries is 




12 Id.; see infra Part III.C.i. 
13 KUNER, supra note 8, at 66. 
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When considering the economic and business implications of 
an adequacy determination, it is easy to see the potential political 
underpinnings of any such decision. A country’s determination of 
whether another country provides a comparable, equivalent, or 
adequate level of protection to personal data is a kind of judgment on 
a foreign regulatory system which may well be guided by political 
considerations. In the EU context, Kuner documents some examples of 
politics influencing adequacy determinations by the Commission.14 
Therefore, the procedures by which adequacy or equivalence 
decisions are adopted play an important role, especially when 
measured by objective standards as mandated by WTO caselaw. For 
instance, the OECD states that very few countries establish publicly 
the substantive criteria used to determine adequacy in data protection 
laws and regulations and recommends that these criteria and 
processes should be transparent, non-discriminatory, and avoid 
unnecessary trade restrictiveness, among other conditions.15 
The adequacy approach does not generally appear as the sole 
mechanism for data transfers within individual privacy regimes. 
Countries that follow this approach tend to also offer alternative 
accountability mechanisms to enable data transfers in the absence of 
an adequacy determination, such as contractual arrangements or the 
consent of the data subject. 
B. Organizationally Based or Accountability Approach 
The organizationally based approach regulates the treatment 
by companies and other organizations of the data that is transferred 
across borders. These organizations are made “accountable” for the 
processing of personal data according to specified privacy principles 
regardless of the location where the data are processed.16 The 
accountability approach does not restrict cross-border data flows but 
imposes responsibilities on the parties that transfer data. 
Under this approach, the protection is based on specific 
obligations established under the law of the data controller that 
continue to apply to the personal data after it crosses national borders. 
 
14 Id. 
15 OECD Report, supra note 4, at 20. 
16 KUNER, supra note 8, at 71. 
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The specific principles vary among different models following this 
approach, as do the ways of instrumenting these obligations. Two 
common forms of the accountability approach are binding corporate 
rules and standard contractual clauses. 
Binding corporate rules impose obligations on companies with 
operations in different countries in terms of data protection. Adopting 
and implementing binding corporate rules allows multinational firms 
to move data across borders - although only among the firms’ affiliates 
in different countries - independently of the individual countries’ 
consideration of one another’s data protection frameworks. These 
instruments usually must be previously approved by data protection 
authorities in the countries involved, which can involve lengthy 
procedures.17 
Standard contractual clauses are rules used in transactions 
involving the cross-border transfer of personal data to third parties. 
These clauses are usually developed or approved by data protection 
authorities and, upon their inclusion in contracts, are deemed as 
sufficiently protective of the data that are transferred, regardless of the 
destination country. They are a convenient mechanism in terms of 
applicability but may include onerous conditions and increase 
administrative costs.18 
Accountability instruments are often established in privacy 
regimes as safeguards or alternative mechanisms to enable cross-
border data transfers in the absence of another “main” legal ground 
such as an adequacy finding. 
C. Comparative Examples19 
i. Adequacy: The European Union 
The regime that gives name to the adequacy approach is the 
EU, currently governed by the General Data Protection Regulation 
 
17 OECD Report, supra note 4, at 21. 
18 Id. at 22. 
19 See generally Ferracane, supra note 5, at 10-27; Rachel F. Fefer, Data Flows, Online 
Privacy, and Trade Policy, R45584 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Mar. 26, 
2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45584; GLOBAL LEGAL 
GROUP, THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: DATA PROTECTION 
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(GDPR).20 Under the GDPR, personal data can be transferred from the 
EU to third countries that provide an “adequate level of protection,”21 
which must be established through an adequacy finding by the 
European Commission. The considerations that go into an adequacy 
finding are also listed in the GDPR and include the existence of the rule 
of law; legislation including public security, national security, and 
criminal law; whether there are effectively enforceable rights including 
administrative and judicial redress for data subjects; and any 
international commitments entered into by the third country.22 
While adequacy determinations may take into account 
different approaches to privacy protection such as self‐regulation by 
firms, in practice such findings have all been made regarding countries 
whose privacy regimes are essentially equivalent to the EU:23 
comprehensive laws that provide a level of data protection, 
government access and rights of redress consistent with EU standards. 
An adequacy finding may also be made with respect to specific 
economic sectors or territories within a third country,24 which until 
recently covered the EU-US Privacy Shield. Concluded in 2016, the EU‐
US Privacy Shield governed transfers of personal data between the EU 
and participating businesses in the United States.25 Though not a third 
country national framework, the Privacy Shield per se was originally 
found by the European Commission as providing an adequate level of 
 
2019 (6th ed. 2019); Aaditya Mattoo & Joshua P. Meltzer, International Data Flows 
and Privacy. The Conflict and Its Resolution, WORLD BANK GROUP POLICY RESEARCH 
WORKING PAPER 8431, 25-26 (2018), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
751621525705087132/pdf/WPS8431.pdf. 
20 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj [hereinafter GDPR]. 
21 Id. at Article 45. 
22 Id. at Article 45.2. 
23 Mattoo & Meltzer, supra note 19, at 9. 
24 GDPR, supra note 20, at Article 45.3. 
25 The Privacy Shield was adopted to replace the EU‐US Safe Harbor arrangement 
after it was found by the Court of Justice of the EU as not providing an adequate level 
of protection. See Court of Justice of the European Union Case C-362/14, Maximilian 
Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?num=C-362/14. 
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protection, but was recently invalidated by the Court of Justice of the 
EU.26 This arrangement established a series of principles, largely 
reflecting EU law, with which U.S. companies self‐certified to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce that they would comply in processing 
personal data.27 These features make such an arrangement more 
challenging to classify, as the data transfers are allowed by an 
adequacy finding but the actual obligations and responsibilities are 
undertaken by the businesses, which could suggest listing this 
approach as an organizationally-based one. 
The GDPR also provides a series of safeguards to enable cross-
border transfers to countries that do not have an adequacy finding:28 
binding corporate rules, contractual clauses, codes of conduct, and 
certification mechanisms. These are accountability instruments that 
seek to ensure protection based on EU law and that must be previously 
approved by the Commission or a Member State’s privacy authority. 
Binding corporate rules (BCRs) are policies consistent with the 
GDPR which are adhered to by a controller or processor established in 
the territory of a Member State for transfers of personal data to a 
controller or processor in one or more third countries within a single 
conglomerate or within a group of enterprises engaged in a joint 
economic activity.29 BCRs must be legally applied and confer 
enforceable rights on data subjects,30 and there must exist a controller 
or processor established in a Member State who can be held liable for 
breach.31 
While BCRs are only available for transfers among corporate 
affiliates, standard contractual clauses (SCCs) are available to all 
companies, and they should ensure the same levels of protection, 
 
26 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy 
of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1; see 
Court of Justice of the European Union Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. 
Facebook Ireland Ltd., Maximilian Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 1-16 (July 16, 
2020). 
27 Id. at ¶¶14-63. 
28 GDPR, supra note 20, at Article 46. 
29 Id. at Article 47. 
30 Id. at Article 47.2. 
31 Id. at Article 47.2(f). 
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oversight and access for individuals consistent with the GDPR as an 
adequacy decision would.32 
Codes of conduct can apply to associations representing 
controllers or processors and can be used to ensure compliance with 
the GDPR standards.33 These instruments must be approved by the 
Commission and be subject to monitoring and enforcement by an 
accredited entity within a Member State.34 
Certification mechanisms allow the development of data 
protection seals and marks to demonstrate compliance with GDPR by 
processors and controllers within the EU. These mechanisms can also 
be used by businesses outside of the EU and serve as a basis for data 
transfers.35 
Finally, the GDPR also contains exceptions (“derogations”) to 
circumvent these requirements, including consent by the data subject 
and transfers necessary to perform a contract or for the purpose of a 
legitimate interest, among others.36 
ii. Other Adequacy Models 
There are several other examples of the adequacy approach 
following the EU model, with variations and sometimes similar 
safeguards or alternatives. 
In Switzerland, personal data may only be transferred to 
countries that provide an “adequate” level of protection, or pursuant 
to other arrangements such as a contract or binding corporate rules, 
for specific public policy purposes, or with the data subject’s consent.37 
Russia’s Data Protection Law, besides establishing local storage and 
processing requirements,38 allows transfers to countries that Russia 
 
32 Id. at Article 46.2(c)-(d). 
33 GDPR, supra note 20, at Article 40. 
34 Id. at Article 41. 
35 Id. at Article 42. 
36 Id. at Article 49. 
37 BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DEN DATENSCHUTZ [DSG], LOI FÉDÉRALE SUR LA PROTECTION 
DES DONNÉES [LPD], LEGGE FEDERALE SULLA PROTEZIONE DEI DATI [LPD] [FEDERAL 
ACT ON DATA PROTECTION (FADP)] Jun. 19, 1992, SR 235.1, Art. 6 (Switz.). 
38 Federal’nyi Zakon RF ot 21 iiulia 2014 g. No. 242-FZ [Federal Law of the Russian 
Federation of 21 July 2014 No. 242-FZ], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI 
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recognizes as offering adequate protection or that are parties to the 
Council of Europe Convention 108,39 or with prior consent of the data 
subject. 40 
In Israel, transfers are permitted to EU Member States, other 
parties to Council of Europe Convention 108, and other countries that 
are recipients from EU Member States. Apart from these, transfers are 
permitted with data subject consent or as part of contractual 
arrangements ensuring compliance with Israeli standards.41 In Turkey, 
personal data cannot be processed or transferred abroad without the 
individual’s consent; but it is not required where the transfer is 
necessary to exercise a right or is required by law, and the recipient 
country provides sufficient protection or the data controller makes a 
security undertaking and is granted permission by Turkey’s Personal 
Data Protection Board.42 
Under Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Act, a company 
may only transfer personal data to recipient countries that provide a 
“comparable” level of protection (or with consent of the individual) 
and must ensure compliance with the Act’s obligations while 
controlling the data. 43 In Japan, the Act on the Protection of Personal 
Information (APPI) allows transfers to countries designated as having 
an “acceptable” level of protection, to a third party abroad that ensures 
the same level of protection as in Japan, for example through 
contractual arrangements, or with the data subject’s consent.44 
In Latin America, several countries have followed the EU 
model closely. For instance, Argentina’s Data Protection Law prohibits 
 
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2014, No. 30, 
Item 4243, Art. 2. 
39 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No.108. 
40 Federal’nyi Zakon RF ot 27 iiulia 2006 g. No. 152-FZ [Federal Law of the Russian 
Federation of 27 July 2006 No. 152-FZ], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI 
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2006, No. 31, 
Item 3451, Art. 12. 
41 Protection of Privacy Law, 5741 – 1981, 5 LSI 136 (5741-1980/81) (Isr.); Privacy 
Protection (Transfer of Data to Databases Abroad) Regulations, 5761-2001, KT 6113 
p. 900 (Isr.). 
42 Law on the Protection of Personal Data, Law No. 6698 of 2016, Art. 9 (Turk.). 
43 Personal Data Protection Act, Act No. 26 of 2012, Art. 26 (Sing.). 
44 Kojin jōhō no hogo ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on the Protection of Personal 
Information (APPI)], Act No. 57 of 2003, arts. 23-24 (Japan). 
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transfers to countries that do not provide an “adequate” level of 
protection,45 which can be circumvented by agreement between the 
data controller and the foreign processor ensuring compliance with the 
local standards of protection, or with the data subject’s consent.46 
Colombia also restricts transfers to countries that do not offer 
“adequate” standards of protection, except with express authorization 
by the data subject, for specific types of data or in the context of 
international conventions.47 In Peru, transfers of personal data can 
only be made if the destination country offers “adequate” protection 
equivalent to the Personal Data Protection Law or international 
standards, if the controller ensures compliance with such standards 
(for example, contractually), or with the data subject’s consent.48 
iii. Accountability: The APEC CBPR 
One of the most relevant examples of the accountability 
approach is the Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) mechanism 
adopted to facilitate personal data transfers among Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries. The CBPRs require 
businesses to develop policies based on the APEC Privacy 
Framework,49 a set of guiding principles based on the OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data. The businesses’ policies and practices must be certified 
by APEC Accountability Agents as consistent with the CBPR 
requirements; APEC Accountability Agents together with national 
Privacy Enforcement Authorities are responsible for enforcing 
compliance.50 Any APEC country can agree to this system unilaterally, 
 
45 Law No. 25,326, Oct. 4, 2000, B.O. 29,517, Art. 12 (Arg.). 
46 Decree No. 1558, Nov. 29, 2001, B.O. 29,787, Art. 12 (Arg.). 
47 L. 1581/12, octubre 17, 2012, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 48587, Art. 26 (Colom.). 
48 Law No. 29,733, Jul. 2, 2011, E.P. 445746, Art. 15 (Peru). 




50 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules 
System (2019), http://cbprs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/4.-CBPR-Policies-
Rules-and-Guidelines-Revised-For-Posting-3-16-updated-1709-2019.pdf; Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules System 
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and businesses that are subject to the country’s laws will be able to use 
it. To date, the participating economies are the United States, Mexico, 
Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Chinese Taipei, and 
Singapore.51 
iv. Other Accountability Models 
In Australia, a company transferring personal data abroad 
must take steps to ensure that the recipient will comply with the 
Australian Privacy Principles (APPs). This requirement is excepted if 
the recipient is bound by similar legal and enforceable requirements 
or the data subject consents, however a company may be held liable 
for breaches of the APPs by the recipient.52 
In Canada, under the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), a company transferring data 
abroad must grant a comparable level of protection while it is 
processed by a third party, preferably through contractual 
arrangements. Data subject consent is not required as the law does not 
distinguish between domestic and international transfers.53 
In New Zealand, consent is not required for data transfers to 
third countries in compliance with the Information Privacy Principles, 
but substantive protections continue to apply to the personal and 
health information even when outside of the country.54 
South Africa requires data subject consent for cross-border 
transfers, but this can be waived if the recipient is subject to laws, 
binding corporate rules or agreements providing an adequate level of 
protection, or the transfer is necessary as part of a contract between the 
 
Program Requirements (2019), http://cbprs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/5.-
Cross-Border-Privacy-Rules-Program-Requirements-updated-17-09-2019.pdf; Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], APEC Cooperation Arrangement for Cross-
Border Privacy Enforcement (2019), http://cbprs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/1.-
Cross-Border-Privacy-Enforcement-Arrangement-updated-17-09-2019.pdf. 
51 ABOUT CBPRS, http://cbprs.org/about-cbprs/ (last visited May 12, 2020). 
52 Federal Privacy Act 1988 (Sch 1 Pt 3) s. 8 (Austl.). 
53 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, div 
1, s. 5, Schedule 1 (Can.). 
54 Privacy Act 1993, s. 114B (N.Z.). 
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data subject and the responsible party or to implement pre-contractual 
measures following the data subject’s request.55 
IV. PRIVACY-BASED DATA RESTRICTIONS IN THE WTO 
FRAMEWORK 
This Part places privacy-based cross-border data flow 
regulations within the multilateral trade regime. Although there are 
suggestions that some operations involving digital services could be 
considered as trade in goods,56 the prevailing view identifies the 
services regime as the appropriate framework governing cross-border 
data flow regulations.57 After an introduction to the WTO regulation 
of trade in services, this Part presents the possible discussions on the 
WTO-consistency of a measure and then focuses on the exceptions 
framework, which will be the ultimate line of argumentation for the 
legality of any such regulation. 
A. The WTO Trade in Services Framework 
Under the WTO regime, the GATS58 establishes two types of 
obligations on Members: general obligations and specific 
commitments. General obligations are owed with respect to all 
Members and all sectors, while specific commitments are undertaken 
by Members for the sectors and modes of supply that they expressly 
set out.59 
 
55 Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 § 72 (S. Afr.). 
56 Andrew D. Mitchell, & Jarrod Hepburn, Don’t Fence Me In: Reforming Trade and 
Investment Law to Better Facilitate Cross-Border Data Transfers, 19 YALE J. L. & 
TECH. 182, 196-97 (2017); MacDonald & Streatfeild, supra note 1, at 633. 
57 Mattoo & Meltzer, supra note 19, at 16; Crosby, supra note 1, at 2; Willemyns, 
supra note 1, at 6-12; Andrew D. Mitchell & Neha Mishra, Data at the Docks: 
Modernizing International Trade Law for the Digital Economy, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 1073, 1088-97 (2018). 
58 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 
[hereinafter GATS]. 
59 MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & MICHAEL 
HAHN, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW PRACTICE, AND POLICY 557-59 (3rd 
ed. 2015). 
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Among the general obligations, the most-favored-nation 
(MFN) principle established in Article II provides that Members must 
“accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it 
accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country.”60 
The MFN obligation prevents Members from granting preferable 
treatment to some Members to the detriment of others. 
This principle is subject to limited exceptions. Most 
importantly, Article V enables Members to conclude agreements 
further liberalizing trade in services as long as the agreements have 
substantial sectoral coverage and substantially eliminate all 
discrimination among the parties.61 This provision is sister to GATT 
Article XXIV and provides the legal basis for services chapters in 
FTAs.62 
As for the specific commitments, the method for liberalizing 
trade in services is fundamentally different from the goods regime. 
Under the GATT, each Member adopts a Schedule of Concessions that 
limits the tariffs that they may impose on goods from other Members.63 
By contrast, the GATS, reflecting a greater reluctance by Members to 
open their services markets, adopts a “positive list” approach64 where 
each Member undertakes commitments to liberalize trade in specific 
sectors in its territory.65 
In its Schedule of Specific Commitments, each Member must 
specify the terms, limitations, conditions, and time frames that it 
applies to each covered sector.66 Moreover, specific commitments are 
undertaken not only by sector but also by mode of supply. The four 
modes of supply covered by the GATS, identified by their order in the 
list, are (1) cross-border, from one Member’s territory into another 
Member’s territory; (2) consumption abroad, in one Member’s 
 
60 GATS, supra note 58, at Article II(1). 
61 Id. at Article V(1). 
62 MATSUSHITA, ET AL., supra note 59, at 573-76. 
63 GATS, supra note 58, at Article II. 
64 MacDonald & Streatfeild, supra note 1, at 633. 
65 In more recent agreements on services, this method has been gradually replaced by 
a “negative list” approach where parties by default undertake to liberalize all trade in 
services and must include in their schedules those sectors and modes that they wish to 
exempt. 
66 GATS, supra note 58, at Article XX. 
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territory to a consumer of another Member; (3) commercial presence, 
by one Member’s service provider through the commercial presence in 
another Member’s territory; and (4) presence of natural persons, by 
one Member’s service supplier through the presence of natural 
persons in the territory of another Member.67 Thus, within each 
possible sector, Members must also detail their commitments for each 
mode of supply of that service. 
The main specific commitments are market access and national 
treatment.68 Regarding market access in the specified sectors and 
modes, Article XVI requires each Member to “accord services and 
service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than 
that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed 
and specified in its Schedule.”69 Market access is thus limited to the 
commitments made by each Member according to its individual policy 
and economic objectives. Article XVI (2) lists the possible limitations 
that a Member may maintain or adopt, if specified in its Schedule, for 
the sectors where commitments are undertaken. These comprise 
limitations on number of suppliers, total value of transactions, number 
of operations, number of natural persons employed, participation of 
foreign capital, or restrictions on permitted types of legal entity.70 
Article XVII enshrines the national treatment principle (NT), 
which requires Members to “accord to services and service suppliers 
of any other Member (…) treatment no less favorable than that it 
accords to its own like services and service suppliers.”71 As with 
market access, this obligation is limited to the sectors and modes 
included in the Member’s Schedules, and subject to the conditions and 
limitations set out therein. 
 
67 Id. at Article I(2). 
68 Susannah Hodson, Applying WTO and FTA Disciplines to Data Localization 
Measures, 18:4 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 579, 590-92 (2019). 
69 GATS, supra note 58, at Article XVI(1). 
70 Id. at Article XVI (2) (a)–(f). 
71 Id. at Article XVII. 
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B. Assessing the GATS-Consistency of Data Regulations 
Regulations on cross-border data transfers might fall under the 
GATS framework in different ways.72 For instance, technologies 
relying on data transfers may enable other categories of covered 
services,73 such as international electronic payment services or other 
services, not necessarily digital, that can be provided electronically 
across borders.74 Moreover, data-related services such as database and 
data processing services may be specifically disciplined in Members’ 
schedules and thus be subject to market access and national treatment 
commitments,75 although the appropriateness of the GATS 
classification scheme to newer digital services is disputed.76 Further, 
the GATS exceptions language is found in new-generation FTAs 
liberalizing trade in services,77 which keeps WTO law and caselaw 
relevant to assess the legality of cross-border data flow regulations 
under newer instruments. 
The GATS-consistency of a restriction on cross-border data 
flows restriction could be called into question based on different 
grounds. 
 
72 Crosby, supra note 1, at 3-4; Hodson, supra note 68, at 586; Susan Ariel Aaronson 
& Patrick Leblond, Another Digital Divide: The Rise of Data Realms and its 
Implications for the WTO, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245, 251-53 (2018). 
73 Hodson, supra note 68, at 586-88. 
74 Mattoo & Meltzer, supra note 19, at 16. 
75 Crosby, supra note 1, at 5-6. 
76 See Mitchell & Hepburn, supra note 56, at 197-99; Hodson, supra note 68, at 581-
82; Mira Burri, The Regulation of Data Flows through Trade Agreements, 48(1) GEO. 
J. INT’L L. 407, 410-17 (2017). 
77 See, e.g., Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican 
States, and Canada (USMCA), Article 32.1.2 (Dec. 13, 2019), https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/
agreement-between (incorporating by reference); Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Article 29.1.3, Mar. 8, 2018, 
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/text-texte/index.aspx?lang=eng (incorporating by 
reference); Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between 
Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other 
part, Article 28.3.2 (Oct. 30, 2016, 2017) O.J. (L 11) 23 (EU) (replicating Article XIV 
textually). 
2020 PRIVACY BEFORE TRADE 111 
First, a measure could be alleged to breach a country’s market 
access or national treatment obligations. In that case, the assessment 
would require analyzing the country’s Schedule of Specific 
Commitments. The restriction would need to be applied consistent 
with the commitments undertaken by that country — including any 
specified limitations and conditions regarding the affected sectors and 
modes of supply. In terms of the covered modes, cross-border data 
flow restrictions of the type reviewed above may impact the supply of 
services under Modes 1 (cross-border), 2 (consumption abroad), or 3 
(commercial presence). As for the affected services, there exist 
restrictions on data transfers for individual sectors such as banking or 
health; these types of regulations may be foreseen in a country’s 
schedule. 
However, the more recent privacy-oriented restrictions are of 
such broad scope that they may potentially affect all services that rely 
on data transfers. There is skepticism that a horizontal, sector-blind 
measure targeting cross-border data flows could be consistent with 
any country’s GATS schedule.78 To the extent that it remains 
technically possible, suffice to say that if a measure were found to be 
in accordance with the country’s schedule, the legality analysis would 
end there. 
Second, a measure could be alleged to breach a country’s 
general obligations. A restriction on cross-border data transfers could 
result in a trade partner receiving more favorable treatment than 
others. For example, if data transfers to a country’s territory or 
involving companies subject to its jurisdiction are allowed while those 
involving other countries are not, or if they are permitted in more 
convenient conditions or subject to fewer restrictions, a prejudiced 
country could allege a violation of MFN (Article II). 
In this case, the legality of a more favorable treatment accorded 
to one or more countries as compared to others could be justified if it 
is established through a preferential trade agreement that complies 
with Article V, including the notification requirements.79 But absent a 
treaty-based ground to grant preferential treatment to some Members 
 
78 See, e.g., Nivedita Sen, Understanding the Role of the WTO in International Data 
Flows: Taking the Liberalization or the Regulatory Autonomy Path?, 21 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 323, 346 (2018). 
79 GATS, supra note 58, at Article V(7). 
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to the detriment of others, a country would have to justify its measure 
as permitted by the General Exceptions, which will be analyzed in the 
next section. 
C. GATS General Exceptions 
This section addresses the most likely ground for discussion 
regarding the WTO-consistency of a cross-border data flows 
restriction. When a measure cannot be justified as consistent with the 
country’s specific commitments or as falling under an exception to the 
MFN obligation, the ultimate line of argumentation on its WTO-
consistency will turn upon its justifiability under the GATS General 
Exceptions,80 and particularly the strict requirements of the necessity 
test and the chapeau. 
GATS Article XIV, closely modeled on GATT Article XX, sets 
forth the general exceptions that Members can rely on to depart from 
their obligations vis-à-vis other Members and their service providers. 
Although there have been very few cases before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) involving Article XIV, the Appellate Body has 
established that the jurisprudence on GATT Article XX is relevant to 
the interpretation and application of its GATS equivalent.81 
Article XIV, like the GATT clause, provides for a two-tier 
analysis by a Panel. The first part consists of establishing if the measure 
falls within the scope of one of the exceptions. This means that the 
measure must address one of the listed objectives and there must be a 
sufficient “nexus” or connection between the measure and the interest 
to be protected. This nexus is required by the language of the 
exceptions through terms like “necessary to” and “relating to,” and is 
thus identified as the necessity test. If the necessity test is fulfilled, the 
second part of the analysis consists of determining if the measure 
complies with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV.82 
 
80 Andrew D. Mitchell & Neha Mishra, Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows in a 
Data-Driven World: How WTO Law Can Contribute, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 389, 397-
402 (2019); Mishra, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
81 Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶291, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 
20, 2005) [hereinafter US - Gambling Appellate Body Report]; MATSUSHITA, ET AL, 
supra note 59, at 613-15. 
82 US - Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, at ¶ 292. 
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i. Public Interests 
Beginning with the listed exceptions, the two most relevant for 
the purposes of data flows regulations are found in subparagraphs (a) 
and (c).83 
Article XIV(a) allows for measures “necessary to protect public 
morals or to maintain public order.”84 As stated by the DSB, the 
meaning of public morals and public order may vary depending on a 
range of factors, and each Member enjoys broad discretion to 
determine the level of protection it considers appropriate.85 However, 
footnote 5 to the subparagraph clarifies that public order “may be 
invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed 
to one of the fundamental interests of society.”86 This indicates a very 
high bar for justification under the public order exception as a country 
would need to demonstrate that a data transfer restriction seeks to 
address a genuine and serious threat to a fundamental interest. 
Conversely, the public morals language appears to preserve a larger 
regulatory space, and it would seem like a plausible ground to invoke 
to justify a privacy regulation. As for the different approaches to data 
transfer regulations protecting privacy, neither seems to fare better 
than the other under Article XIV(a) since both adequacy and 
accountability models seek to ensure a certain level of protection 
identified by the adopting country. 
Article XIV(c) allows Members to adopt measures “necessary 
to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with [the GATS].”87 For this exception, the DSB has 
applied the approach adopted regarding GATT Article XX(d), which 
consists of three steps. A Member must identify the laws or regulations 
which the challenged measure is intended to secure compliance with; 
then it must prove that those laws or regulations are not inconsistent 
 
83 Hodson, supra note 68, at 593. 
84 GATS, supra note 58, at Article XIV(a). 
85 Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶6.461, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (adopted Apr. 20, 
2005). 
86 GATS, supra note 58, Article XIV(a), footnote 5. 
87 Id. at Article XIV(c)(ii). 
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with the GATS; and demonstrate that the measure is designed to 
secure compliance with those laws or regulations.88 
The exception includes a non-exhaustive list of policy 
objectives that the laws or regulations may pursue. Most importantly, 
(c)(ii) addresses “the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation 
to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the 
protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts.”89 
This language offers the most appropriate ground for a country to 
justify a privacy-based restriction on cross-border data flows; of 
course, it would need to identify the substantive protections that the 
restriction advances, prove that they are themselves GATS-consistent, 
and demonstrate the nexus between the restriction and the substantive 
protections. For example, justifying the GDPR restrictions on data 
transfers under (c)(ii) would require identifying the substantive 
protections and rights enshrined therein, showing their GATS-
consistency, and establishing the link between such protections and 
the transfer restrictions. 
Like with public morals, the wording of this exception does not 
seem to favor any privacy approach over the other. Both adequacy and 
accountability models seek to ensure that personal data are subject to 
a certain substantive protection established in the national laws or 
regulations or other instruments, while the differences arise regarding 
the focus of such responsibility. 
In any case, privacy and public morals are likely to be accepted 
as justifications considering the treaty language,90 and thus a measure 
would be easily found to fall under subparagraphs (a) or (c). The 
biggest hurdles will appear in the necessity and the chapeau parts of 
the analysis. 
ii. Necessity 
Having determined that a measure falls under one of the 
Article XIV exceptions, the respondent Member must demonstrate that 
 
88 Panel Report, Argentina - Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, 
¶¶7.595-7.596, WTO Doc. WT/DS453/R (adopted May 9, 2016) [hereinafter 
Argentina–Financial Services Panel Report]. 
89 GATS, supra note 58, at Article XIV(c)(ii). 
90 Mitchell & Hepburn, supra note 56, at 202-03. 
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the measure is “necessary to” achieve the stated objective. The DSB has 
established this requirement as a high threshold for respondent 
countries, significantly closer to the level of “indispensable” than to 
that of just “making a contribution to.”91 This standard demands a 
strong connection between the measure and the protected interest, 
which must be established through the “necessity test,” a holistic 
evaluation that involves “weighing and balancing a series of factors.”92 
Although the DSB caselaw does not establish an exhaustive 
series of factors to be considered, the process of weighing and 
balancing generally involves assessing the relative importance of the 
interests or objectives underlying the measure; the contribution of the 
measure to the realization of the objective; and the restrictive impact 
of the measure on international trade.93 Although the standard of 
necessity is objective, a Member’s characterization of the measure’s 
objectives and its regulatory approach are considered relevant to the 
evaluation.94 The elements of contribution and trade-restrictiveness 
present the more challenging questions: the stronger the contribution 
of a measure to its objective, the greater trade-restrictiveness is likely 
to be tolerated; and the more trade-restrictive a measure, the greater 
the contribution to the objective that the Member must demonstrate.95 
The final part of the necessity test consists of determining 
whether there exists a less trade-restrictive alternative measure that is 
reasonably available to the Member.96 This requires a comparison 
between the measure and possible alternatives, with the burden of 
proof falling on the complaining Member to put forward the latter.97 
An alternative measure would not be considered reasonably available 
if it is merely theoretical, for example if the Member is not capable of 
taking it, or if it imposes an undue burden on the Member, such as 
prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties.98 Moreover, a 
reasonably available alternative measure must be able to preserve the 
 
91 MacDonald & Streatfeild, supra note 1, at 639-40. 
92 US-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, at ¶¶ 306–07. 
93 Id. at ¶¶ 306–07; MATSUSHITA, ET AL, supra note 59, at 615-17. 
94 US-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, at ¶ 304. 
95 Mitchell, & Hepburn, supra note 56, at 204. 
96 US-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, at ¶¶ 304-05. 
97 Id. at ¶¶ 309–10. 
98 Hodson, supra note 68, at 594. 
116 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 28 
right of a Member to achieve its desired level of protection regarding 
the objective pursued.99 
This stage of the analysis presents the bigger challenges when 
assessing privacy-based restrictions. Among the factors indicated for 
weighing and balancing, the objectives underlying the measure will 
generally point to the country’s identification of its public policy 
interests. Since Article XIV expressly mentions public morals and 
privacy, the necessity analysis would focus on the measure’s 
contribution to the stated objective, its trade-restrictive impact, and the 
availability of alternative measures. 
Here, countries enforcing strict restrictions like local storage or 
processing requirements, which are expected to have a highly 
restrictive impact on trade, will face a high burden to demonstrate the 
measure’s contribution to the stated objective. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that data localization measures in themselves may not 
improve security or privacy, and thus may not meet the necessity 
test.100 Moreover, possible alternative measures that have a less 
restrictive impact have been suggested, although their availability 
would depend on the country’s technical resources.101 
Conditional restrictions protecting privacy, however, are in a 
grayer area. Among the two representative approaches to cross-border 
data regulations (adequacy and accountability), it does not seem as 
either would be per se easier to justify under this test than the other. In 
any case, a respondent country would need to demonstrate that the 
measure contributes to data protection in a way that is proportional to 
the trade-restrictive impact, and there is not one particular regulatory 
approach that implies in itself a greater contribution to privacy or a 
deeper impact on trade. Assessing any individual measure would 
require a close analysis of the legal instrument and its actual impact, 
which might be technically challenging. 
Further, the very existence of different regulatory approaches, 
and the coexistence of elements from both approaches within several 
individual regimes, would suggest the availability of alternative 
measures. The evaluation and comparison of each type of measure’s 
trade impact and availability to a country is an exercise that the DSB, 
 
99 US-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, at ¶ 308. 
100 Sen, supra note 78, at 337. 
101 Mitchell & Hepburn, supra note 56, at 204. 
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and even the parties to a dispute, might not be technically prepared to 
engage in. 
This serves to illustrate that the necessity test implies a level of 
examination and analysis that could call any regime into question. The 
success of any questioned country’s defense under this test will hinge 
on its ability to justify its regulatory choices and show that no less 
restrictive measure could achieve the same objective. Even considering 
that a measure satisfies the necessity test, it would still have to meet 
the chapeau requirements, which might constitute the biggest hurdle 
for an Article XIV defense. 
iii. Chapeau 
If the necessity test is passed, the last part of the analysis will 
be determining if the measure complies with the Article XIV chapeau. 
The chapeau, phrased in very similar terms to GATT Article XX, 
requires that the measures “are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
trade in services.”102 
This text bars three types of effects that may arise from the 
application of a measure: arbitrary discrimination between countries 
with like conditions, unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
with like conditions, or a disguised restriction on trade in services. In 
GATT disputes, arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination have 
generally been addressed together; if there is either arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries or a disguised trade 
restriction, the conclusion is that the measure cannot be justified under 
the provision.103 
Moreover, the DSB has highlighted the use of the word 
“applied,” suggesting that the focus of the analysis should be on how 
a measure is implemented and operates in practice.104 Any 
arbitrariness or discrimination in the application of the measure will 
thus make its justification under the chapeau more difficult. For 
 
102 GATS, supra note 58, at Article XIV. 
103 Argentina–Financial Services Panel Report, supra note 88, at ¶¶ 7.745-7.746. 
104 Mitchell & Hepburn, supra note 56, at 204-05; MATSUSHITA, ET AL, supra note 59, 
at 620-21. 
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example, if data transfers are allowed to particular countries or by 
particular companies without the fulfilment of requirements that are 
imposed on others, or a set of legal standards is not applied 
consistently among countries, justification under the chapeau would 
be problematic. Moreover, arbitrariness, discrimination or a disguised 
restriction could be established if national service providers are 
exempt from prohibitions that prevent or limit data transfers by 
foreign companies. 
Here, some distinction might be drawn between the chances 
for success of the two leading privacy approaches. Of course, any 
measure would have to be analyzed individually in terms of its 
application and effect. However, the respective regulatory approaches 
of the adequacy and accountability models present differences that 
might help predict which type of model could be more likely to be 
found in violation of the chapeau. The adequacy approach conditions 
data transfers upon the recipient country’s privacy protections, while 
the accountability approach focuses on the responsible company 
committing to protect the data according to specified standards. 
As such, adequacy determinations involve one country’s 
decision regarding another’s legal regime and can result in a ban of 
transfers to a country deemed to provide “inadequate” protection, or 
at least an additional cost for companies needing to adjust their 
operations to abide by any applicable safeguards. In that case, a 
respondent country would be obliged to demonstrate that the criteria 
for an adequacy determination are not applied arbitrarily or in a 
discriminatory manner, overcoming any suspicions about political 
motivations.105 
Accountability models, on the other hand, are generally 
implemented as requirements in abstract that all companies must 
comply with regardless of their nationality. Although there could be 
arbitrariness, discrimination, or a disguised restriction aimed at 
particular companies, for example to benefit a local firm, the 
 
105 See Gianpaolo M. Ruotolo, The EU data protection regime and the multilateral 
trading system: Where dream and day unite, 51 QIL 5, 25-28 (2018), and Stefano N. 
Saluzzo, Cross Border Data Flows and International Trade Law. The Relationship 
between EU Data Protection Law and the GATS, XXXI(4) DIRITTO DEL COMMERCIO 
INTERNAZIONALE 807, 828 (2017) (suggesting that the GDPR might be incompatible 
with the chapeau). 
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regulatory approach is less likely to be used against a particular 
country. 
Furthermore, it seems a more plausible scenario for a country 
to bring a complaint before the DSB against another Member’s 
measure barring all transfers to its territory due to its “inadequacy” 
than to do so out of a refusal to recognize as valid an individual 
company’s binding corporate rules or contractual arrangements. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the linkage between cross-border data 
flow regulations aimed at protecting privacy and the multilateral trade 
regime. These two spheres of regulation are growing closer as data 
transfers, and especially those involving personal data, become ever 
more central to the global economy. It is thus a matter of time before 
legal challenges to regulations that are perceived to disguise 
protectionism or discrimination against countries or firms are brought 
before international dispute settlement fora. 
In this sense, the paper has established that privacy-based 
restrictions may be challenged under the GATS. Should that happen, 
respondent countries would be forced to justify their measures either 
as permitted by their GATS obligations or as covered by an exception. 
In the first case, a measure could be justified if it is covered by a 
respondent’s specific commitments, which seems unlikely for a 
horizontal measure targeting all sectors. Otherwise, a challenge 
invoking a breach of MFN treatment could be survived if a “more 
favorable” treatment regarding data transfers were arranged through 
an FTA covered by Article V. 
As for the GATS exceptions, privacy-based restrictions are 
likely to fall within Article XIV(a) or (c), but a respondent country 
would face a very high threshold to pass the necessity test and 
demonstrate compliance with the Article XIV chapeau. Regarding the 
latter, adequacy regimes could be especially difficult to justify if they 
are applied in a way that discriminates against certain countries (i.e., 
if adequacy determinations are granted or refused based on grounds 
that cannot survive the chapeau requirements). It remains to be seen 
whether the harmful effects of a particular restriction could be 
sufficiently quantifiable, or the discriminatory treatment sufficiently 
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demonstrable, for a country to bring suit before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body or other fora. 
In any case, the implications for trade and privacy are vast and 
wide-ranging. With digital trade at center stage, data flows are crucial 
to the global economy. At the same time, countries concerned with 
protecting public policy interests affected by data flows, such as 
privacy, engage in domestic regulation with potentially significant 
trade implications. The international trade regime provides binding 
dispute settlement mechanisms offering a unique way for affected 
countries to bring claims against data regulations. By assessing the 
hurdles for justification of privacy-based restrictions under WTO law, 
this paper shows how the trade arena may shape the regulation of 
privacy in years to come. If litigation over such restrictions results in 
specific features of privacy regulations being considered inconsistent 
with WTO obligations, countries may be incentivized to make 
adjustments in order to avoid complaints. Moreover, WTO 
negotiations on electronic commerce or digital services would very 
likely deal with disciplines on privacy regulations, which would have 
to be able to pass muster under the GATS exceptions framework. 
Even considering the WTO’s delay in achieving new rules and 
the current situation at the Appellate Body, which could render WTO 
dispute settlement ineffective, the potential GATS-inconsistency of 
data regulations is also relevant to new-generation FTAs. With FTAs 
replicating the GATS exceptions language, binding dispute settlement 
under these newer instruments might also contribute to shaping 
privacy law by the application of the necessity analysis or by 
“importing” a potential WTO caselaw on the matter. 
In short, this paper highlights the inextricable link between the 
fields of trade and privacy. Cross-border data flow regulations 
protecting privacy necessarily have implications for international 
trade. At the same time, the trade regime involves rules that, if 
disputed and applied, might end up invalidating some of these 
regulations. As this paper has shown, the ultimate line of 
argumentation for a country facing a complaint over a data regulation 
would be the GATS exceptions necessity test and chapeau 
requirements, and it remains to be seen whether any respondent 
country could win the day. 
